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Abstract:  Information disclosure requirements significantly increased in French listed 
companies in the early 2000s, converging toward the U.S./U.K. stock market standards. 
Following the burgeoning literature on relations between corporate governance and labor, 
we investigate the consequences of this process regarding worker information: does more 
information for shareholders mean more information for workers? We take advantage of a 
French (representative) establishment survey that generates linked ‘employer–employee’ data 
at two points in time, 1998 and 2004. Our results strongly suggest that worker information 
has improved in listed companies but not in private ones, as an externality of the 
financialization process.  We find however that this extra information is  only partially 
correlated with greater employee satisfaction, as measured through the perception of fair 
recognition by supervisors. 
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Introduction 
Does more information for shareholders mean more information for workers? And 
does more information for workers increase job  satisfaction?  This article addresses these 
issues by using a nationally representative French linked employer-employee data. 
Over the last two decades, stock market activity has sharply grown in the U.S. as well as in 
Europe. At the same time, there has been a continuous increase in equity holdings by financial 
investors managing diversified portfolios, to the detriment of households, cross-holdings by 
non-financial companies and the State. This evolution has caused deep transformations at the 
corporate level with  stock price becoming  a crucial metric for the management of listed 
companies. In terms of corporate governance, there is evidence of significant evolution 
underway since the beginning of the 1990s that has been driven by (minority) shareholder 
activism and regulatory changes. Regarding board composition, inside directors have steadily 
declined to the benefit of outsiders.
1  Regarding executive remuneration, stock-based 
compensation has gained in importance  in the U.S., U.K. and France. Altogether, these 
evolutions have increased the sensitivity of corporate executives to the interests of minority 
shareholders, thereby promoting a shareholder-value-oriented approach to managing a 
business (Useem, 1996; O’Sullivan, 2000; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001; Dore, 2008; 
Lazonick, 2008). 
Growing attention is now paid to the implications of this financialization  process for 
employment and industrial relations (Froud, Haslam, Johal and Williams, 2000; Gospel and 
Pendleton, 2004; Jacoby, 2005). In particular, some studies have explored the influence of 
corporate governance and ownership structure on human resource management practices 
(Jackson, Höpner and Kurdelbusch, 2004; Jacoby, Nason and Saguchi, 2005; Black, Gospel 
and Pendleton, 2007; Conway, Deakin, Konzelmann, Petit, Rebérioux and Wilkinson, 2008; 
Perraudin, Petit and Rebérioux, 2008).
2 There is, however, one aspect of this process likely to 3 
 
influence labor relations that has received little consideration until now: the increase in 
information disclosure and transparency requirements faced by corporate executives. 
Information on the company’s prior performance and future prospects is a critical resource for 
financial investors and demand for greater and better reporting is a key component of the 
financialization process: listed companies are under strong pressure by shareholders and 
regulators to regularly disclose financial and non-financial information, contrary to private, 
non-listed companies. In this article, we investigate whether this process has contributed to 
increase information sharing with workers, and whether it has been associated with greater 
job satisfaction.  
Considering information, it is then possible that shareholders and workers align their interests 
vis-à-vis  management, sharing a common interest in greater disclosure (Kostant, 1999; 
Jackson et al., 2004). If true, we bring to light a potential tradeoff that may be summarized as 
follows. On the one hand, the financialization process tends to ‘prioritize’ the interests of 
shareholders, with allegedly adverse consequences regarding worker commitment to the firm 
(see  e.g.  Armour, Deakin and Konzelmann, 2003; Gelter, 2009).  On the other hand, by 
making the firm more transparent to workers, this  process  might also  have  favorable 
outcomes in terms of commitment. 
France constitutes a noticeable opportunity to highlight institutional transformations in the 
corporate sector and the way these transformations  have impacted labor and industrial 
relations inside firms. Indeed, evolution of the French model of corporate governance has 
been particularly dramatic over the 1995-2005 period,  with the growing presence of 
investment funds (Anglo-Saxon and French) in the equity capital of listed companies and far-
reaching transformations in securities and corporate law. In particular, between 2001 and 
2003, a new regulation on information disclosure was developed for listed companies, largely 
along the lines of the financial disclosure requirements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 4 
 
Commission (S.E.C.) model. In this study, we  take  advantage of a large data set, the 
REPONSE survey, conducted by the Research and Statistics Department of the French 
Ministry of Labor (DARES). It  aims to provide an account of the state of employment 
relations inside French workplaces.
3 Conducted both in 1998 and 2004, the surveyed sample 
is representative of establishments with 20 workers or more in the French productive sector. 
In each establishment, one senior manager and several employees are questioned on a large 
range of topics, including industrial relations, labor organization, firm ownership and the 
competitive environment. As such, this survey generates a linked employer-employee dataset 
that allows to study in detail the relations between stock market listing, information sharing 
and job satisfaction.  
Our findings might be summarized as follows: 
•  In the mid-2000s, the intensity of information sharing with workers is higher in listed 
firms as compared to non listed firms, controlling for a large set of observable characteristics 
at the firm, workplace and workforce levels. An instrumental variable approach supports an 
interpretation in terms of causality. We find no such evidence in 1998, before a series of 
regulatory changes increased the disclosure requirements for listed firms. We interpret this 
change in the propensity of listed firms to share information with workers as a side effect 
resulting from the increase in  transparency requirements towards shareholders faced by 
managers in these firms. 
•  We find that employee job satisfaction is linked to  information  sharing. Yet, the 
relation only concerns one type of ‘disclosure-induced’ information, namely information on 
the social and environmental consequences of the firm’s activity.  In  contrast,  we do not 
observe any significant  correlation between information  sharing on  general strategy or 
economic situation of the firm and worker job satisfaction.  5 
 
The  remainder of the article is ordered as follows. The following section  discusses  the 
conceptual framework.  The next section presents  the empirical analysis, concerning the 
relations between stock market listing and information sharing on one side, and between 




Shareholders, workers and information 
In the U.S., and from a legal point of view, the difference between listed and non-
listed companies in terms of disclosure is clear-cut. Listed companies are subject to the 
federal securities regulation of the S.E.C., which has had the primary objective, since its 
creation by the Securities Exchange Act in 1934, to ensure that investors and shareholders 
have the information necessary to make accurate decisions (Brown, 2007). Toward this end, 
the S.E.C.  provides listed companies with high standards of information reporting and 
disclosure, perceived as the core of an effective control of corporate executives in a situation 
of separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Black, 2000).  These 
standards reinforce specific rules  imposed by stock exchanges. In contrast, corporate 
governance in private companies is only regulated by state law, which does not provide a 
coherent, strong disclosure regime. This dichotomy has become stronger since the early 
2000s, with the surfacing of multiple high profile corporate scandals and bankruptcies. 
Although  institutional investors were putting pressure on corporate executives for greater 
transparency, regulators strengthened disclosure requirements as a perceived solution to 
managerial abuses.
4 In addition, listed companies are more and more inclined to ‘voluntarily’ 
disclose information, so as to please investors and secure the value of their shares. 6 
 
In France, and generally in continental Europe, the situation was, until the beginning of the 
2000s,  rather  different. Stock markets were usually less active, with a lower degree of 
separation between ownership and control (Faccio and Lang, 2002). Hence, corporate 
governance regulation was not as inclined to protect minority shareholders from managerial 
abuses.
5 Informational needs by minority shareholders and investors were not considered as 
important as they are in the U.S., and disclosure regimes, as structured by corporate and 
securities laws, were far less comprehensive. In relation, and considering the French case, the 
regulator was traditionally reluctant to make a distinction between listed and non-listed firms, 
rather discriminating between companies on the basis of their legal statute (Société anonyme, 
Société en nom collectif, etc.).
6  Accordingly, there was,  until early 2000s, no specific 
regulation for listed companies in terms of reporting and disclosure – except listing standards 
as defined by the Bourse de Paris before the creation of Euronext in July 2000. A listed 
Société anonyme did not face really different, higher, disclosure requirements in comparison 
to a private one whose shares are freely transferable, yet not traded on a regulated market. 
A second difference regarding corporate governance was, and still is, worker involvement, 
with a range of mechanisms designed to sustain the collective voice of workers in continental 
Europe, contrary to the U.S. In particular, the workforce has information and consultation 
rights provided by labor laws, through unions (in Italy and Sweden) or, more often, through a 
representative body, usually the works council. France is a good example of those information 
rights, with a comprehensive regime of disclosure to the benefit of the works council (comité 
d’entreprise).
7 For example, article L2323-6 of the Labor code states the following: « the 
works council shall be informed and consulted on issues that concern labor organization, 
management and general business conduct and, in particular, on the decisions that might 
affect the volume and the structure of the workforce, employment and working conditions and 
training » (translated).  7 
 
In sum, the two models are opposites, with strong disclosure requirements for minority 
shareholders in one case, and for workers in the other. However, this distinction between the 
Anglo-American and European continental models of corporate governance is progressively 
being overturned. The shift of the continental European model of shareholding towards the 
Anglo-Saxon model is now widely discussed in the comparative literature (see, for example, 
Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). 
Concerning France, a dramatic growth in stock market capitalization took place over the last 
15 years, mostly because of the increasing presence of financial investors, both resident and 
non-resident. Tirole (2006) estimated that one-third of the capital of French listed companies 
was held by non-residents in 2002. In 2005, for the largest companies (included in the 
CAC40), 46.4% of the equity capital was held by non-residents, with more than 20% by 
British and U.S. funds looking for international diversification of their portfolios (Poulain, 
2006). This increase in the power of minority shareholders in the equity capital of French 
companies has been accompanied by a decline in blockholdings, a sharp increase in the 
equity-based part of executive remuneration and a rise in the proportion of independent 
directors at the board level. The entry of new investors has also put pressure on listed 
companies to adopt a more open form of communication. In parallel, important changes in 
securities law and, to a lesser extent,  in corporate law, have strongly enhanced minority 
shareholder protection (Lele and Siems, 2006). Arguably, information disclosure is the area 
that has experienced the deepest transformation. By doing so, a specific regulation for listed 
companies has developed, largely along the lines of the financial disclosure requirements of 
the U.S. S.E.C. model. 
The distinction between listed and non-listed firms has been clearly adopted by the French 
regulator since the beginning of the 2000s, at odds with the traditional approach. The first step 
was the “New Economic Regulation” (N.E.R.) Act of May 2001, which forced listed 8 
 
companies, and only them, to disclose a Rapport de gestion (business report) yearly, including 
a document on the general situation of the company and its expected evolution, as well as a 
document detailing how social and environmental consequences of corporate activity are dealt 
with. Concerning executive remuneration, the N.E.R. Act increased transparency for all of the 
Sociétés anonymes, whether or not the shares are traded on a regulated market. However, the 
Financial Security Law (August 2001) soon restricted this obligation to listed  Sociétés 
anonymes only. Note that these provisions, forcing managers to disclose information on the 
social and environmental consequences of the activity and on executive remunerations, were 
not  covered by stock exchange standards. Moreover, they were not part of workers’ 
information rights as defined by labor law. They have therefore the potential to benefit both 
shareholders and workers. 
In summary, managers in French listed companies have experienced, over the last 15 years, a 
strong pressure by minority shareholders and regulators for greater and better reporting as a 
direct consequence of the financialization process. We may conjecture that this evolution has 
improved worker (and not just shareholder) information for at least two reasons. First, and 
from a legal perspective, works councils have the right to receive all of the (periodic and 
ongoing) information communicated to shareholders: article L2323-8 of the Labor Code 
requires corporate officers to transmit to the work council the whole set of documents that 
have been disclosed to shareholders. Considering “law in the books”, the French model of 
corporate governance and industrial relations therefore favors a transmission of information 
from shareholders to workers. Second, and from an economic point of view, the fact that 
corporate executives have to disclose (and therefore process and ‘build’) information for 
shareholders allegedly decreases the cost of communicating this information to workers. If 
true one may anticipate that this extra information is slightly different from what is usually 
addressed by labor law and communicated by managers to workers. This ‘disclosure-induced’ 9 
 
information should concern strategic dimensions of the firm’s future global position, rather 
than ‘shop floor-related’ issues such as organizational and technical changes, employment 
prospects or wage evolution. In sum, although there were no reasons to posit any differences 
in terms of information access between workers in listed and private companies in the 1980s 
or  1990s, it is likely that workers employed in listed firms now have richer and better 
information on a range of topics related to the firm’s strategy.  
 
Information sharing inside the workplace 
Theoretical  and  empirical literature has put forward various arguments  for  the 
importance of information sharing inside the workplace, defined as the provision of 
information to workers by corporate managers. We briefly survey these arguments. 
First, information provision to workers helps them to adequately adjust their level of 
investment in firm-specific human capital by increasing the accuracy of their expectations 
regarding the firm’s future prospects. A number of studies have acknowledged the growing 
significance of firm-specific human capital on firm performance and economic growth (e.g., 
Blair and Wallman, 2001; Corrado, Hulten and Sichel, 2006). Importantly, it is now widely 
recognized that workers investing in firm-specific human capital have a residual claim on the 
(uncertain) firm’s future value, like stockholders investing at risk in the company’s shares 
(Blair, 2000; Zingales, 2000): as such, more information means better investment. 
Second, the limitations of information asymmetry should help to enhance managerial 
accountability by improving the ability of workers to monitor (together with shareholders) 
corporate executives (Gelter, 2009; Moore and Rebérioux, 2011). It is especially valuable in 
countries where worker involvement is legally supported, as in continental Europe, with 
codetermination in the form of board-level participation (as in Germany) or with strong rights 
for work councils (as in France). It should therefore come as no surprise that German trade 10 
 
unionists tend to consider transparency as a tool for codetermination, thereby supporting 
financial investors in their demand for reliable information (Jackson et al., 2004). 
Third, information disclosure to workers provides their representatives with information that 
might be valuable in collective bargaining. Although the net effect on wage is open to 
debate,
8 both theory and evidence suggest that information sharing tends to shorten and ease 
the negotiation process and decrease the probability of a strike (Morishima, 1991). 
Last but not least, several recent papers have directly focused on information sharing with 
workers as a human resource management (HRM) practice that might be implemented by 
corporate officers  to foster worker engagement. Researches on HRM practices have 
traditionally investigated the relations between bundles of practices (training, performance-
related pay, problem-solving team, etc.) and employee outcomes. The breakdown of these 
bundles into single  practices allows a more precise, albeit often more complex, analysis. 
Interestingly, a couple of papers points out that information sharing is significantly associated 
with different employee outcomes, often more than other practices. Kalmi and Kauhanen 
(2008) is a striking example, based on Finnish data. They adopt a  broad perspective, 
distinguishing six different outcomes (job intensity, job influence, job security, wage, stress 
and job satisfaction) and  four HRM practices (or workplace innovations): self-managed 
teams, incentive pay, training, and information sharing. The latter is defined with a dummy 
variable, based on employee interviews, that takes value 1 if workers are informed about 
changes at work at the planning stage, rather than at the implementation stage. Information 
sharing is the only practice that exhibits a conditional, significant (at 1%) correlation with all 
six  outcomes: controlling for various individual and establishment variables, information 
sharing decreases job intensity and stress, and increases job influence, security, satisfaction 
and wage. Two other studies investigate the relations between information sharing and 
voluntary employee turnover: if valued by workers, greater information sharing should 11 
 
increase commitment and decrease quit rate. Haines, Jalette and Larose (2010) examine the 
Canadian non governmental sector. They distinguish various HRM practices, among which 
mechanisms designed to stimulate workers' participation. These  mechanisms include 
employee suggestion program, problem-solving teams, self-directed work groups, flexible job 
design and information sharing. Information sharing at the workplace level is measured with a 
dummy variable based on managerial answer. They perform tobit regression, to capture the 
correlation between these various HRM practices and the voluntary turnover rate in 2000. 
Estimation results show that the sole participation mechanism correlated with quit rate is 
information sharing (negative point estimate, significant at the 10% level). Cottini, Kato and 
Westergaard Nielsen (2009) also investigate the relations between HRM practices and quit, 
on Danish data. They are interested in the moderating effect of various HRM practices on the 
impact of adverse workplace conditions on labor turnover. Information sharing is captured 
with a dummy that takes value 1 if the worker considers he/she is always or often informed of 
the decisions affecting his/her establishment, 0 otherwise. They observe that the interaction 
term between information sharing and physical hazards exposition for workers is negatively 
correlated with labor turnover, therefore suggesting  that  being informed significantly 
mitigates the (adverse) impact of adverse working condition on quit. The two other HRM 
practices, voice and training, do not appear to have the same mitigating role. 
Taken together, these results point to the importance of information sharing, associated with 
various positive worker outcomes (job satisfaction, stress, etc.) and lower employee 
(voluntary) turnover rates. They are coherent in suggesting that information sharing increases 
worker’s subjective well-being. At least, this evidence calls for further researches on this 




Empirical analysis  
 
Listing and information sharing 
Both in 1998 and 2004, the REPONSE survey is representative of establishments with 
20 workers or more in the French productive sector, excluding the agricultural and the public 
sectors. The survey comes in waves of cross-sectional data, where the same firms are not 
necessarily sampled wave after wave.  In each establishment, one executive officer (manager) 
is questioned in a face-to-face interview on a large range of topics regarding industrial 
relations and labor organization, as well as competitive environment. The survey also includes 
a self-completion questionnaire distributed to a sample of workers, designed so as to be 
representative of the French workforce in private establishments with at least 20 employees.  
In 2004, the data was initially collected from 2930 managers. We drop workplaces belonging 
to (non-profit) associations because they present highly specific patterns of employment and 
industrial relations. We end up with a dataset of 2503 establishments. We also use the 1998 
survey that provides similar linked employer-employee data. For 1998, we have information 
for 2380 establishments once associations are dropped. Information on industry and the socio-
demographic characteristics of the workforce is  drawn from the DADS (Déclarations 
Annuelles  de  Données Sociales), a matched employer-employee administrative dataset 
constructed from social security records.  
To evaluate the intensity of information sharing (the dependent variable), we use the 2004 
manager survey, where the employer is asked whether or not the information transmitted to 
workers is frequent. The question is repeated so as to cover a range of seven different topics: 
(i) the strategic orientation of the firm, (ii) the economic situation of the firm, (iii) the social 
and environmental consequences of the firm’s activities, (iv) the employment prospects at the 
establishment or firm level, (v)  wage prospects, (vi)  training opportunities and (vii) 13 
 
organizational or technological change. In 1998, similar questions are raised, albeit with one 
difference: the item ‘social and environmental consequences’ does not exist.
9  Summary 
statistics (using REPONSE sampling weight) for these variables are presented in Tables A1 
and A2 for 2004 and 1998, respectively (see Appendix). Both for 1998 and 2004, we observe 
that information is more frequent in listed companies than in non listed firms. Note, however, 
that a multiplicity of compounding factors may be at stake here, so a multivariate analysis is 
required before reaching conclusion on the relations between listing and information sharing. 
 
Empirical strategy 
Logit models are used to estimate the (logarithm of the) odds-ratio of the information 
as frequent in the establishment according to the manager:  
ln (Pjk / 1 – P jk ) = !  + Xj "  + # listed j  + $j 
where Pjk  is the probability for the manager in establishment j to estimate that information on 
topic  k  = {1,…,7}  is frequent (Ijk = 1).  Xj  is a vector of control variables including 
respondent’s individual characteristics,  workplace characteristics, and firm characteristics 
(see infra). listed is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the establishment j belongs 
to  a listed firm (or is directly listed), 0 otherwise.  $j  is the  independent and identically 
distributed random noise. The models are unweighted: as such, they provide within-sample 
estimates rather than population estimates.
10 
The previous analysis makes no attempt to account for the potential endogeneity of a stock 
market listing with respect to worker information. Although there is a priori no reason to 
suspect a reverse causality, it is clear that listing is not random. Accordingly, one might 
suppose that some unobserved omitted characteristics of the firm would imply both a greater 
propensity to communicate information to workers and a higher probability to get listed on a 
regulated market. 14 
 
A common procedure to alleviate endogeneity concerns is to have an instrumental variable 
estimation approach. We use the extent of the market as an instrument: firms that compete on 
the global, international market, rather than at the national or local level, are more likely to be 
listed because stock market listing enables them to raise a large amount of equity capital. At 
the same time, there is no reason to suppose that the extent of the market per se has any direct 
effect on worker information. Our instrumental variable model is based on a recursive 
bivariate probit estimation (see e.g. Greene, 2003) as both our regressor (listing) and outcome 
variables (information quality) are binary. In the first stage, we estimate the odd-ratio of being 
listed on a set of regressors including our instrument (market size). The second stage 
estimates the odd-ratio of delivering frequent information incorporating the predicted 
probability of listing among regressors. Estimations are simultaneous to account for the 
possible correlation between residuals. 
 
Control variables 
At the firm-level, we control for the size (number of employees). At the 
establishment-level, we control for the size (number of employees), age and state of the 
market over the three years preceding the survey (growth, stable or decline). Concerning the 
industry, we first use an indicator that distinguishes between 16 different positions (Naf 16). 
However, because industries might be an important determinant of industrial relations while 
being correlated with stock market listing, we also control, in alternative models, for an 85 
positions indicator (Naf 85) and for a 3-digit indicator when possible (185 positions). By 
doing so, we intend to hone in closely enough to industry characteristics: firms within 
narrowly defined industries should a priori  choose similar production and organization 
methods and have similar workforce compositions, thereby permitting better observation of 
the conditional effects of stock market listing.  15 
 
The characteristics of the workforce are taken into account through the structure of 
occupational groups (proportion of managers, supervisors and technicians), the proportion of 
employees aged under 40 and the proportion of women. Concerning industrial relations at the 
establishment level, the French legal system allows distinguishing two types of worker 
representatives.
11 First, those directly elected by their colleagues (who are potentially, but not 
necessarily, union members). As such, they participate in various consultative bodies: 
workplace delegate (délégué du personnel), works councils (comité d’entreprise) or 
equivalent and health, safety and improvement of working conditions committee (comité 
d’hygiène, de sécurité et des conditions de travail). Second, union delegates are those directly 
nominated by unions. They are the only ones entitled to participate in negotiations with 
employer representatives. We therefore introduce two dummy variables: one indicating the 
presence of an elected worker representative body, the other indicating the presence of union 
delegates, both at the establishment level. We also introduce individual-level information into 
the regressions to characterize the interviewed manager (function and tenure). 
For 1998, the same variables are used, with two exceptions (no information available): the age 
structure of the workforce at the establishment level and the 3-digit industry indicator. 
Summary statistics for the firm and workplace characteristics are presented in Appendix 
Table A3 for 2004 and 1998. The proportion of establishments belonging to a listed firm is 
very stable between the two dates, with 26.3% in 2004 and 25.4% in 1998. 
 
Estimation results 
Table 1 shows that there is  a positive, significant conditional correlation between 
being listed and the frequency of information in 2004. Looking at model 1 (logit estimation, 
16 positions industry dummy), we observe that, except for wage prospects, all of the point 
estimates are significant at the 1, 5 or 10% levels. This global correlation between listing and 16 
 
information frequency is robust to a narrower definition of industries (85 positions instead of 
16, in model 2). As an ultimate check regarding sector, we also control in an alternative 
specification with a 3-digit indicator:
 the point estimates are very similar to model 2, and for 
all items, the level of statistical significance is  unchanged.
  12  Accordingly, industry 
differences between listed and non-listed firms do not drive our results. 
Overall, this correlation is  more  pronounced for four items: the strategy, the economic 
situation of the firm, the environmental and social consequences of the firm’s activities and 
training opportunities. Interestingly, these items are those of greatest interest for financial 
investors, with the noticeable exception of training. As such, they are directly covered by 
information disclosure requirements in corporate law. In contrast, information sharing is less 
intense regarding shop-floor related issues (employment and wage prospects, organizational 
and technological changes). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Model 3 in Table 1 presents estimates of the listing effect on worker information derived from 
the instrumental variable approach. In all of the regressions, the instrument performs well, 
with a first stage conditional correlation (between market size and listing) significant at the 
1% level. The results confirm the view that listed companies better inform their workers. 
Compared with models 1 and 2, the significance level (and point estimates) of the 
instrumental variable estimations are increased. Once again, information of direct interest to 
financial investors (firm’s strategy, economic situation and environmental and social 
consequences of its activity) stands out as being particularly related to stock market listing. 
Wage prospects is the only item for which listing has no impact on information regardless of 
the estimation method.  In Table A4, we present  the full bivariate probit estimation  for 
information sharing on strategy. We observe that the size of the establishment and/or of the 
firm has no significant impact on the intensity of information sharing.
13 In contrast, the sector 17 
 
is an important factor: construction, business and personal services sectors are characterized 
by a low intensity of information sharing. Without surprise, the structure of the workforce 
displays a strong relationship  with information  sharing.  Information  increases with the 
proportion of high-skilled and young workers (less than 40 years old). Finally, the presence of 
a works council (or equivalent) has no significant impact on the frequency of information 
sharing. This result may be explained by the small share of establishments without works 
council in our sample (10.6%, unweighted statistics). This share is due to the fact that our 
sample  excludes very small establishments  (not required by labor law  to have such a 
structure). 
In the previous section, we identified two distinct mechanisms that contribute to transmit 
information from shareholders to workers: a legal  one whereby corporate executives  are 
mandated by  (labor)  law to transmit shareholder information to the work council and an 
economic one, related to the low cost of information transmission once produced. Our data do 
not allow us to disentangle these two mechanisms: a possibility would have been to interact 
stock market listing with the presence of works council. However, more than 95% of our 
listed workplace have such a council (unweighted statistics), leaving us with too few variation 
to make proper identification. 
Estimations run on the 2004 cross-section survey are replicated with the 1998 survey. Once 
again information sharing is estimated through the manager questionnaire, where questions 
strictly similar to 2004 were posed. Table 2 gives the estimation results. The difference with 
2004 is salient: the conditional correlation between information frequency and listing is not 
significant for five items out of six. A positive relation only holds for information on the 
firm’s strategy. Using a 16 or 85 positions dummy for sector (models 1 and 2, respectively) 
does not make any difference.
14 Implementing instrumental variable estimations confirms the 18 
 
conclusion: we do not find any statistical relations between listing and information quality, 
regardless of the item (model 3 in Table 2).  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Summary 
Our empirical analysis on cross-sections yields the following conclusion: the link 
between information sharing and being listed is estimated to be (much) lower in 1998 than in 
2004, conditional on a large set of observable covariates. We therefore document a 
modification of the conditional correlation between listing and worker information over time, 
from a non-existent relation to a positive one. The empirical analysis is not performed on a 
panel, but the two cross-sections are designed so as to be representative of the productive 
sector at each point in time. Cross-sectional analyses, together with the instrumental variables 
approach, therefore supports the hypothesis that there has been a change in the way listing 
impacts information sharing. These results support the idea that stock market pressure and 
regulatory changes have improved worker information in listed companies between 1998 and 
2004, but not in private ones. 
 
Information sharing and job satisfaction 
The crucial question is then the following: do workers really care about the 
information they receive? Put differently, does more information have  any favorable 
consequences for workers? As discussed in the first section, a couple of recent studies have 
explored this issue. Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008) find a positive correlation between the 
intensity of information sharing, as defined by workers, and several outcomes, among which 
job satisfaction. In addition, Haines  and  al.  (2010)  find  evidence of a negative relation 
between information sharing, as defined through managerial answer, and employee voluntary 
turnover.  However, these studies do not make any distinction between different types of 19 
 
information. Our analysis so far shows  that not  all  types of information are equally 
determined.  Combs, Liu, Hall and Ketchen  (2006)  also suggest that not all types  of 
information are equally important for workers. Accordingly, just like the recent literature on 
HRM practices has progressed by ‘debundling’ practices (see section 1), we improve on 
previous researches by distinguishing different types of information: we study distinctly their 
relations with job satisfaction. 
Different dimensions might be used to measure job satisfaction (Clark, 1996; Warr, 2007). 
Contrary to WERS, the REPONSE survey does not contain any direct question on this point. 
However,  the 2004 employee survey includes  a  question  that  informs  on employees’ 
perception of recognition of their effort by supervisors. Arguably, the recognition of one’s 
work, i.e. the perception of fair treatment given his/her effort, is a crucial component of job 
satisfaction  and organizational commitment (Warr, 2007: 128-137).  We therefore explore 
whether information sharing with workers has any significant relation with the perception that 
have employees to be fairly recognized by their hierarchy. The question we use is stated as 
follows: “Given your overall effort, does your firm recognize your work fairly?” We define 
work recognition as a dummy that takes value 1 if the answer is yes, 0 otherwise. For 42.51% 
of workers the answer is positive.   
Before proceeding with the regressions, it is important to note that our dependant variable 
(work recognition) and our variables of interest (information sharing on different topics) do 
not come from the same questionnaire. Like Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008) with job 
satisfaction, we use the worker questionnaire to assess recognition of effort. However, our 
measure of information sharing is based on the manager survey: it reflects employers’ 
perception. We think that such a design reduces the probability for our results to be driven by 
unobserved heterogeneity at the individual  (worker)  level: for example, a worker with a 20 
 
‘positive’ attitude (or optimistic nature) may find both that information is substantial and 
recognition of effort important enough. 
We merge our sample of workplaces with the employee survey. We end up with 5781 
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where P
rec
ij  is the probability for worker i in establishment j to consider that he/she is fairly 
recognized by supervisors, Xi is a vector of individual controls, Xj is a vector of  workplace 
and firm characteristics, and Ijk, a dummy variable that takes value one if information sharing 
on topic k  = {1,…,7}  in establishment j  is frequent, zero otherwise.  We  estimate seven 
different regressions for the seven topics on information sharing. $ij is the independent and 
identically  random noise.  As we have several workers per establishment, we account for 
within-cluster correlation by computing robust standard errors, clustered on establishments. 
In our baseline model (1), individual controls (Xi) include gender, tenure (in three classes), 
occupation (in four classes), working part time, and union membership (present or past). 
Table A5 present summary statistics for these variables, using REPONSE sampling weight. 
As a robustness check (model 2), we also introduce the (individual) net hourly wage
16: we 
expect perception of recognition to be strongly related with the wage level. At the workplace 
or firm level, we control for industry (16 positions), establishment size and age, firm size, 
proportions of women, white collar and employees aged under 40, presence of union 
representative and presence of elected worker representatives. Crucially, we also control for 
stock market listing. Ignoring this information may bias estimated coefficients on information 
sharing, as we have shown that, at least in 2004, both variables are strongly correlated. Our 
test is therefore the following: once netted out the effect of stock market listing and other 21 
 
covariates, does information sharing significantly correlate with employees’ perception of fair 
recognition? Table 3 presents the results of regressions. 
In model (1), three topics out of seven display a significant positive conditional correlation 
with recognition  of work, at the 5% level: information on the environmental and social 
consequences of the activity, information on wage prospects and information on training. 
These results are robust when controlling for wage (model 2), even if it slightly reduces point 
estimates (information on social and environmental consequences becomes significant at the 
10% level)
17. Our results are in line with previous studies as they show evidence of a positive 
relation between information sharing and job satisfaction (as estimated by fair recognition of 
effort). They also point out, as expected, that not all information are equally important for 
workers. Interestingly, neither the information on strategy nor on the economic situation, that 
are strongly disclosure-induced, is correlated with recognition. Put differently, workers are 
not so sensitive to general, strategic information regarding their firm or workplace. Shop-
floor-related information, on the evolution of wage and training opportunities, appears to be 
more important in terms of subjective well-being. Information on wage in particular appears 
as an important driver of job satisfaction while it is the only item for which we did not find 
any relation with stock market listing (see Table 1). 
Together these results suggest that there is a gap between disclosure-induced information and 
satisfaction-enhancing information.  There is however one important exception, with the 
information on social and environmental consequences of the activity. As discussed in the 
first section, reporting on this topic was introduced in corporate law by the New Economic 
Regulation Act of May 2001, as a way to strengthen the disclosure regime of French listed 
firms and to take into account the potentially significant externalities of (large) corporations. 
We have evidence here that this topic is highly valued by workers: frequent information 




Demand for greater and better information disclosure in listed companies is a key 
component of the financialization process in the U.S. and  in Europe. In this article, we 
address the potential consequences of this process for workers: (i) does worker information 
increase? (ii) if so, does it improve worker job satisfaction ? We use a matched employer 
employee linked dataset representative of the French productive sector to provide answers. 
Concerning the first question, our answer is positive. We find that worker information has 
improved in listed companies between 1998 and 2004, but not in private ones. Although we 
observe no positive conditional correlation between stock market listing and the intensity of 
information  sharing with workers in 1998, we document  a positive correlation in 2004. 
Further, our empirical strategy supports an interpretation in terms of causality, with stock 
market listing leading to higher information sharing. We interpret the difference between 
1998 and 2004 as a side effect of the dramatic changes in the French corporate governance 
model over the period, notably the increased presence of financial investors in the equity 
capital of listed companies and new information disclosure requirements. 
Concerning the second question, the answer is more ambiguous. We find that information 
sharing is associated with a more frequent feeling by employees of fair recognition of effort. 
However, we show that workers do not consider all types of information as equally important. 
In particular, we do not observe a clear correspondence between disclosure-related topics, 
highly valued by shareholders and financial investors, and recognition-enhancing topics, more 
directly connected with the shop-floor (wage prospects and training opportunities). 
Information on the environmental and social consequences of the activity is singular, as it 
seems to have a positive impact on  workers well-being  while being  initially  driven  by 
corporate law and shareholder information concerns. It is important to bear in mind that we 23 
 
use one proxy for job satisfaction, as measured through the perceived recognition of effort by 
supervisors. Further explorations might be conceived, focusing on other possible proxies or 
other outcomes, such as voluntary turnover or employee engagement.     
Finally, our research contributes to the literature on the financialization of the business firm. 
This process has caused major changes at the corporate level, with management now being 
primary focused on share price. It has often been argued that this transformation in corporate 
governance has had, and still has, rather negative impact on workers’ commitment. According 
to this ‘constraint hypothesis’ (Conway et al., 2008), the quest for (short term) stock price 
increase may have triggered a cost-cutting approach to human resource management practices 
(Hutton 1995; Porter 1997). As such, a shareholder value-oriented approach to managing a 
business constrains the capacity of management to enter into cooperative arrangements with 
workers. At the same time, the instability brought by the growing intensity of the market for 
corporate control (in the 1980s in the US, in the 2000s in continental Europe) may have 
impeded corporate executives to engage in long term relationships with their employees. 
Altogether, these changes could have a detrimental effect on worker commitment, revealing a 
“dark side of shareholder value” (Gelter, 2009). Empirical work, both quantitative studies 
(Black et al., 2007; Conway et al., 2008) and qualitative case studies (Jackson et al., 2005, 
Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelmann and Wilkinson, 2006) have produced so far mixed evidence on 
this ‘constraint hypothesis’. In this article, we somehow highlight  a ‘bright  side’  of 
shareholder value: workers have also benefited from stock market pressures for greater 
disclosure. They are now better informed on a range of topics regarding their firm and its 
environment, and for at least one of these topics (the social and environmental consequences 
of the activity), this process appears  to have increased  workers’  job satisfaction and 
commitment. In ending, our research underlines the ambiguous impact of the financialization 
process for workers: although it potentially decreases the ability of managers to enter into 24 
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Table 1 – Estimation results for information sharing, 2004 
Point estimates for ‘Listed’!
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 










































Estimation method  logit  logit  biprobit (IV) 
Sector dummy  Naf 16  Naf 85  Naf 16 
Source: Establishments of 20 employees or more in the private sector (excluding 
agricultural sector). 2,503 observations. 2004 REPONSE survey, manager representative 
questionnaire, Dares. 
Significance level: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Reading: first line, model (1): logit estimation of the probability that information is given 
on strategy, with a naf 16 sector dummy, yields a point estimate of 0.275 for ‘Listed’, 
significant at the 1% level. 
Notes: (a) Each line corresponds to a given item as a dependent variable. (b) Each column 
presents the results of a different regression model. (c) Point estimates are the log of the 
odds-ratios. (d) Standard errors in parentheses. (e) Controls include industry, establishment 
size and age, firm size, activity (growth, stable, decline), % women, % white collar, % of 
employees aged under 40, presence of union representative, presence of elected worker 




Table 2 - Estimation results for information sharing, 1998 
Point estimates for ‘Listed’ 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
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(0.585)   
Estimation method  logit  logit  biprobit (IV) 
Sector dummy  Naf 16  Naf 85  Naf 16 
Source: Establishments of 20 employees or more in the private sector (excluding 
agricultural sector). 2,380 observations. 1998 REPONSE survey, manager representative 
questionnaire, Dares. 
Significance level: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Reading: first line, model (1): logit estimation of the probability that information is given 
on strategy, with a naf 16 sector dummy, yields a point estimate of 0.232 for ‘Listed’, 
significant at the 5% level. 
Notes: (a) Each line corresponds to a given item as a dependent variable. (b) Each column 
presents the results of a different regression model. (c) Point estimates are the log of the 
odds-ratios.  (d) Standard errors in parentheses. (e) Controls include  industry, 
establishment size and age, firm size, activity (growth, stable, decline), % women, % 
white collar, presence of union representative, presence of elected worker representatives, 





Table 3 - Estimation results for recognition of effort, 2004 
Point estimates for each information topic 
  Model (1)  Model (2) 




























     
Log (wage)  No  Yes 
Estimation method  Logit  Logit 
Source: Workers in establishments of 20 employees or more in the private 
sector (excluding agricultural sector). 5,780 observations. 2004 REPONSE 
survey, manager representative and employee questionnaires, Dares. 
Significance level: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes:  (a)  The dependant variable is, in both column 1 and 2, work 
recognition (b) Each line presents the results of a different regression, with a 
specific topic for information introduced as independent variable. (c) Point 
estimates are the log of the odds-ratios. (d) Robust standard errors, clustered 
on establishments, in parentheses. (e) Controls include industry, establishment 
size and age, firm size, % women, % white collar, % of employees aged under 
40, presence of union representative, presence of elected worker 
representatives, skill, tenure and sex of the interviewed employee and whether 
he(she) is a union member. (f) log wage is the logarithm of the net hourly 





Table A1 - Information sharing inside workplace, 2004 
Means (%) of variables 









Strategy  45.91  55.41  42.52 
Economic situation  55.52  66.26  51.69 
Envir. & social consequences   27.39  33.78  25.11 
Employment prospects  43.01  51.47  39.99 
Wage prospects  42.84  47.98  41.01 
Training opportunities  59.76  71.42  55.61 
Org. & techn. changes  41.74  46.47  40.06 
Source: Establishments of 20 employees or more in the private sector (excluding 
agricultural sector). 2004 REPONSE survey, manager representative 
questionnaires, Dares. 
Note: all variables are weighted by REPONSE sampling weights. 
 
 
Table A2 - Information sharing inside workplace, 1998 
Means (%) of variables 









Strategy  44.23  54.81  40.64 
Economic situation  52.55  62.79  49.07 
Employment prospects  42.16  48.24  40.09 
Wage prospects  38.57  45.92  36.08 
Training opportunities  65.60  72.93  63.12 
Org. & techn. changes  50.67  56.33  48.75 
Source: Establishments of 20 employees or more in the private sector (excluding 
agricultural sector). 1998 REPONSE survey, manager representative 
questionnaires, Dares. 
Note: all variables are weighted by REPONSE sampling weights. 33 
 
 
Table A3 – Firm, establishment and respondent characteristics 






Firm and establishment characteristics     
Listed  26.27  25.36 
Establishment size     
from 20 to 50  63.75  64.66 
from 50 to 100  19.72  18.66 
from 100 to 200  9.60  10.10 
from 200 to 500  5.43  5.01 
more than 500  1.50  1.57 
Firm size     
Only one estab.  48.56  47.01 
less than 200  23.41  17.06 
from 200 to 500  6.46  8.26 
from 500 to 1000  4.37  4.80 
more than 1000  17.20  22.86 
Establishment age     
less than 10 years  14.16  30.89 
10 to 50 years  67.91  58.28 
more than 50 years  17.93  10.83 
State of the market     
Growth  57.58  54.19 
Stable  27.15  30.36 
Decline  15.28  15.45 
Union delegate in the estab.  36.36  34.30 
Elected worker representative in the estab.  75.04  73.36 
Proportion of women 
less than 15%  27.40  35.32 
15 to 60%  51.48  39.07 
more than 60%  21.12  19.35 
miss  -  6.26 
Proportion of managers, supervisors and technicians 
less than 15%  29.91  23.79 
15 to 30%  26.34  28.84 
30 to 50%  18.09  14.04 
more than 50%  25.65  12.76 
miss  -  20.57 
Proportion of employees aged under 40 
less than 40%  18.08  - 
40 to 70%  52.40  - 
more than 70%  29.52  - 
Manager characteristics      
Function (working in HR department)  22.51  19.81 34 
 
Tenure     
less than 4 years  33.79  20.07 
2 to 9 years  19.93  10.98 
10 years and more  46.29  21.43 
miss  -  47.52 
Source: Establishments of 20 employees or more in the private sector 
(excluding agricultural sector). 1998 and 2004 REPONSE surveys, manager 
representative questionnaire, Dares.  Workforce characteristics are drawn 
from the DADS, INSEE. 
Note: all variables are weighted by REPONSE sampling weights.  
 
 
Table A4 – Complete estimation results for information sharing on 
strategy , 2004 








  Point estimate  Point estimate 
Fitted value for listed  -  1.109*** 
Sector dummy  
Agri-food industry  ref  ref 
Consumer goods industry  -0.115  -0.118  
Automotive industry  0.281  0.031 
Capital goods industry  0.176  -0.024 
Intermediate goods industry  0.085  -0.146 
Energy  -0.682***  0.581*** 
Construction  0.259  -0.467*** 
Commerce  -0.010  -0.013 
Transports  0.242  -0.279* 
Financial activities   0.202  0.226 
Real-estate activities  -0.987*  0.439 
Business services  0.151  -0.291** 
Personal and domestic services  0.138  -0.362** 
Education, health, social services  -0.232  -0.123 
Establishment size 
from 20 to 50  ref  ref 
from 50 to 100  0.169*  0.036 
from 100 to 200  0.221**  -0.028 
from 200 to 500  0.348***  -0.070 
more than 500  0.305***  0.013 
Firm size 
Only one estab.  ref  ref 
less than 200  0.049  0.070 35 
 
from 200 to 500  0.340***  0.056 
from 500 to 1000  0.560***  -0.111 
more than 1000  0.811***  -0.017 
Establishment age 
less than 10 years  ref  ref 
10 to 50 years  -0.172*  0.157* 
more than 50 years  -0.207*  0.114 
State of the market 
Growth  ref  ref 
Stable  -0.054  -0.015 
Decline  0.063  -0.123* 
Union delegate in the estab.  0.380***  -0.099 
Elected worker representative in the estab.  0.134  0.098 
Proportion of women 
less than 15%  ref  ref 
15 to 60%  0.047  0.011 
more than 60%  -0.083  0.077 
Proportion of managers, supervisors and technicians 
less than 15%  ref  ref 
15 to 30%  0.168*  0.245*** 
30 to 50%  0.308***  0.229** 
more than 50%  0.455***  0.224** 
Proportion of employees aged under 40 
less than 40%  ref  ref 
40 to 70%  -0.116  0.129* 
more than 70%  0.024  0.397*** 
Function (working in HR department)  -  0.025 
Tenure 
less than 4 years  -  ref 
2 to 9 years  -  0.139** 
10 years and more  -  0.032 
Market openess (instrumental variable)  0.386***  - 
Intercept  -1.422***  -0.805*** 
Estimated Rho   -0.674*** 
Source: Establishments of 20 employees or more in the private sector (excluding 
agricultural sector). 2,503 observations. 2004 REPONSE survey, manager 
representative questionnaire, Dares. 
Significance level: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Reading:  step  (1)  estimates the probability to be listed and step (2) estimates the 
probability that information is shared with workers on strategy. 
Note: Point estimates are the log of the odds-ratios. 36 
 
 
Table A5 - Individual characteristics for 
employees, 2004 
Means (%)  of variables  
Women  35.63 
Part-time  9.45 
Occupation   
Manager   18.89 
Technicians and associate professionals  24.55 
Clerical and sales worker  20.35 
Production worker  36.21 
Tenure   
less than 9 years  48.76 
10 to 20 years  26.96 
20 years and more  24.29 
Union member   
Yes  7.35 
No, but was before  12.79 
No, never  79.87 
Field: Employees of establishments of 20 employees or more in 
the  private sector  (excluding agricultural sector).  5,781 
observations. 
Source: 2004 REPONSE surveys, employee questionnaire, Dares 





                                                 
1 These ‘independent’ directors are considered to be less captured by the internal (managerial) perspective and in 
a better position to favor stock market evaluation with respect to corporate conduct (Gordon, 2007). 
2  The intensive use of performance-related pay in listed companies pursuing shareholder-value-based 
management strategies is a common finding of these studies: individual and collective bonus schemes tend to 
align workers’ incentives with those of the firm, and also increase the flexibility of business cost structures over 
time, something valuable in terms of financial management. 
3 REPONSE has, to a large degree, been modeled on WERS, the Workplace Employment Relations Survey, 
carried out in the U.K.. 
4 A conspicuous example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with the principal objective of protecting and 
enhancing the financial disclosure integrity of listed companies. 
5 The main issue was the protection of minority shareholders from abuses by large blockholders (see Enriques 
and Volpin, 2007). 
6 The French corporate law offers a menu of companies or statutes that differ in terms of director duties, creditor 
rights, shareholder protection, transferability of shares, etc. Some of these forms are authorized to list their 
shares on a regulated market, whereas others are not. The main (but not unique) vehicle for quotation is the 
Société anonyme, even though a majority of them are not listed. 
7 A comité d’entreprise is required in all firms with 50 or more employees. 
8 By increasing the identification of workers with firm goals, information sharing may lead employees to accept 
more moderate wage increases. It is, however, possible that such disclosure improves labor’s bargaining power, 
thereby increasing the union's ability to deliver a high wage settlement for its membership. 
9  The item was introduced in the 2004 survey precisely to gauge the effect on workers of the new 2001 
regulation on reporting (see supra), forcing listed companies to report on the environmental and social impact of 
their activity. 
10 Following Reiter, Zanutto and Hunter (2005), we introduce the variables that have been used to build the 
weights as regressors, namely establishment size and sector. 
11 See Goetschy and Jobert (2004) for a comprehensive presentation of the French employment relations system. 
12 Results are not reported here but are available upon request. 
13 Note that in logisitc models (1 and  2), we have evidence that very large firms (more than 1000 employees) 
significantly provide more information on strategy (p-value<0,001). 
14 As noted earlier, these estimations are similar to those run in 2004, with one exception: we do not have, in 
1998, the proportion of the workforce aged under 40. To check whether this difference may account for the 
difference in results between the two periods, we have re-run our 2004 estimations excluding the age structure of 
the workforce: the results still indicate a very significant correlation between listing and information frequency. 
Results are available upon request. 
15 Let us underline that we perform this regression in 2004 only, as we do not have any prediction in terms of 
evolution (contrary to our previous empirical tests): we are interested in knowing whether information sharing is 
valued by workers, whatever the period of investigation. In particular, we do not pretend that information would 
be more or less important in 1998 as compared to 2004 in terms of worker well-being. 
16 This variable is drawn from the Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales. 
17  Note that individual wages are always positively and significantly correlated with our measure of work 
recognition.  